Trans-Atlantic relations in the Southern Cone : a common security agenda by Khanyile, Moses B.
Trans-Atlantic relations in the Southern Cone:
A common security agendal
MOSES B. KHANYILE
Centre for Military Studies, University ofStellenbosch
Introduction
The countries on both shores of the South Atlantic Ocean have often looked more to
the north for solutions to their so.cio-economic and security challenges than to their
counterparts across the ocean. This approach has not only resulted in mutual neglect but
has also exacerbated threat perceptions among neighbours. The establishment of the
Mercusor (the Common Market of the South) and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) for the Latin American and Southern African regions respectively,
signals the awareness of the commonness of challenges and the need for regional
solidarity. Through these sub-regional arrangements, inter-state tensions have been
reduced drastically but intra-state conflicts still pose the greatest threat to regional
stability. However, both regional organisations have 'inward-looking' agendas. Trans-
Atlantic exchanges remain peripheral and minimal. Measured in terms of trade flows, for
instance, between the two continents, Africa's total exports to and imports from Latin
America in 1995 were slightly over two percent of Africa's overall trade. Similarly, Latin
America's trade with Africa amounted to just one percent of her overall trade value.2
This paper argues that the security arrangements in the South Atlantic Ocean have
to incorporate trans-oceanic interests within the context of regional interdependence.
Increased co-operation in the fight against transnational and transcontinental drug
trafficking, small arms proliferation, illegal fishing activities and other security challenges
that transcend states and regions could contribute towards regional stability and
international peace and security. The paper further argues that the Zone for Peace and
Co-operation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) provides a common denominator through
which both the Mercusor and SADC countries can establish and enhance their security
interests for mutual benefit.3 It concludes by providing a brief discussion on the
involvement of the Mercusor countries in peace support operations in Africa.
This is an edited version of a paper "Trans-Atlantic Relations in the Southern Cone: A Common
Security Agenda", presented at the Symposium on International Peace and Security: The Afiican
Experience, in commemoration of fifty years of United Nations Peacekeeping 1948 - 1998, at the
South African Military Academy, Saldanha, 21-23 September 1998.
Stahl, H.M. "Prospects for Cooperation between SADC and Latin American Trade Blocs." Paper
presented at the conference on 'Trading with Latin America: Benefits and Opportunities', Pretoria,
24-25 June 1998.
It is worth noting that there are only four SADC countries that form part of the ZPCSA, viz. Angola,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Namibia and South Africa. Of the four Mercusor
countries, Paraguay does not form part of the ZPCSA.
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The zone of peace and co-operation in the South Atlantic
Co-operation on security between countries of Africa South of the Sahara and those
of Latin America is better expressed in the form of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation in
the South Atlantic (ZPCSA). Proposed by Brazil and eventually established in the mid-
1980s, the Zone came out of the realisation that security, peace and stability in the South
Atlantic region can be achieved only through co-operation of countries on both shores of
the Atlantic Ocean. The need for the eradication of all forms of violent inter-state conflict
became even more evident after the Falkland War of 1982 between Argentina and Britain
over the Malvinas/ Falkland Islands. On the eastern side the Atlantic, tensions between
Namibia and South Africa, and the role played by extra-regional powers in the civil war
in Angola remained a great challenge to peace initiatives in the region.4 These two issues
dominated the United Nations' General Assembly debate on the Zone in 1986. Measures
to protect the region from militarisatiori, arms race, the presence of foreign military bases
and nuclear weapons had to be devised. To this end, the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 41/11 of 27 October 1986 in terms of which the Zone was established.
Namibia and South Africa only joined it in 1990 and 1994 respectively.s
The main areas of concern to the Zone were: social and economic development; the
protection of the environment; the conservation of the living resources; and the peace and
security in the region. The subsequent resolutions adopted by the General Assembly -
since resolution 43/23 of 14 November 1988 to resolution 52/14 of 15 January 1998 -
have increasingly shown that issues of development, peace and security are inter-linked to
the point that the role of armed forces of the region is crucial.
The role of the armed forces
The armed forces of the member states have different, but specific, roles to play in
the areas identified by the Zone.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The countries of the Zone are connected to each other by the vast masses of oceanic
waters of the Atlantic. Communication and trade among the countries of the Zone, and
those outside the region, take place through the sea. This is particularly important in
peacetime. In wartime, the sea provides access to territorial targets and to vital supplies
on the continent that are needed to support the war effort.6 The strategic value of the
South Atlantic region to other powers, especially those with global interests, makes it
vulnerable to unnecessary extra-regional interference. Since none of the Zone member
states can individually determine the security agenda of the region, co-operation is the
United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/11 of 27 October 1986.
The ZPCSA initially had 22 member states (three South American and 19 African): Angola.
Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d'Jvoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sao Tome e Principe, Senegal. Sierra
Leone, Togo, Uruguay, and Zaire. Namibia joined in 1990 and South Africa in 1994. See Venter.
D. 1996. "South Africa, Brazil and South Atlantic Security: Towards a Zone of Peace of Co-
operation in the South Atlantic", in Guimaraes, S.P. (ed.) 1996. South Africa and Brazil: Risks and
Opportunities in the Turmoil of Globalisation. International Relations Research Institute (IPRJ), p.
33.
Bessone, R.G.D. 1979. "The Strategic Importance of the South Atlantic for the Security and Supply
of the Free World", in Council for Inter-American Security and the Institute of American Relations.
1979. Free World Security and the South Atlantic: Inter-American Symposium - 1970. Washington,
D.C.: Council for Inter-American Security and the Institute of American Relations, p. 19.
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key strategy. This can be achieved through harmonisation of national security policies,
especially those dealing with maritime issues in the South Atlantic region.
GROUPING IMPORTS (Rm) EXPORTS (Rm)
MERCUSOR 2444,6 1601,1
ANDEAN 174,2 416,2
NAFTA 17010,8 10849,6
Table 1: South Africa's Trade with Latin America -1996 7
Source: The South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 1997.
To South Africa, the region requires proper protection in order to ensure a safe and
a smooth flow of goods, people and ather commercial activities. Like most of the littoral
countries in the Zone, South Africa relies heavily on the Atlantic Ocean for imports from
and exports to the Americas (see Table I). The Southern African countries, most of
which are landlocked, have commercial, cultural, political or other links with the
Americas and therefore also benefit from the security of the Atlantic Ocean. It is vitally
important that trade routes to these destinations be kept open and free to enable
commercial maritime traffic to conduct its business without fear of danger. The navies
and air forces of the Zone countries have to ensure that safety and security for
international maritime traffic is guaranteed. Piracy and illegal commercial activities,
especially in the high seas, remain the challenge for these naval forces. According to
Sass, "[p]iracy on the high seas is an international crime and all states may and will act
against it, as they are likely to do against slave trading and drug trafficking."s The
absence of piracy and other forms of transoceanic criminal activity do not only promote
the image of the region as a safe passage route, but it also enables littoral countries to
conduct their commercial activities without fear. This becomes particularly important in
order to enhance economic interaction among countries in the South, and to improve
South-South relations.
The vast distance separating both Latin America and Africa from the largest
economic blocs of the North, i.e. the European Community (EU), North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC» makes
social and economic co-operation among the countries of the Zone imperative, possibly
with a view to establishing a free trade zone in the South Atlantic region.9 When South
Africa took over the chairmanship of the Zone from Brazil during its fourth meeting held
on I and 2 April 1996 in Somerset West, the South African delegation emphasised the
importance of revitalised economic and commercial interaction in the region. The
following aspects were to receive immediate attention: capital market development and
liberalisation, co-operation in the development of infrastructure, in science and
technology, in mining and mineral exploration, and also in trade and tourism. 10
10
The South African Institute of International Affairs. 1997. South African Yearbook of International
Affairs, 1997. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of InternationaJ Affairs.
Sass, B. 1995. "The Challenge for African States", in Mills, G. (ed.) 1995. Maritime Policy for
Developing Nations. Johannesburg: The International Institute for International Affairs, p. 202.
Venter, D. 1996. Op cit., p. 42.
Venter, D. 1996. Ibid., p. 43.
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ENVIRONMENT AND CONSERVAnON OF LIVING RESOURCES
The member states identified the environment as another area of great concern for
the region. The resolutions adopted at the Rio Summit on Environment and Development
of 14 June 1992, and the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) of 10 December 1982 require some form of monitoring and enforcement
capability. South Africa signed the latter convention on 2 October 1994 before it came
into force on 16 November 1994. The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, which came into force on 20 March 1966, also
provided a framework for the conservation of marine resources. II During the Zone
meeting held in Somerset West, the member states emphasised the importance, in terms
of the provisions of UNCLOS III, of the Agreement on the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 4 August
1995 for member states of the Zone.12 These multilateral arrangements to which South
Africa, together with other member states of the Zone, are signatories, place a positive
responsibility on the law enforcement agencies, particularly their navies, to safeguard the
South Atlantic region.
Pollution and dumping of hazardous radioactive materials in the South Atlantic is
another area of concern. The strategic value of the Cape route has not declined as most of
the oil from the Middle East, which is bound for Europe and North America, is shipped
around the Cape.13 This is despite observations by analysts, such as Morris, that "there is
an inflated perception of the importance of the Cape route." According to Morris, "the
only advantage of the Cape is that the maritime traffic from the Western countries can cut
the corner, but if this is not possible, they can still go wide as there are at least two
thousand miles between the Cape and the Antarctic ice cap.,,14 However, the fact remains
that most ships cannot afford to go very wide and that they have to rely on South Africa
and other members of the Zone for essential supplies and for safety and rescue facilities.
During the Zone meeting in 1996 the member states reiterated the importance of
"safe and secure transportation through the South Atlantic of irradiated nuclear fuels,
plutonium and high-level wastes.,,15 In some cases, rules and regulations governing
precautionary measures to be taken when transporting such hazardous materials are
flouted. Most of these regulations are embodied in multi-lateral arrangements such as the
London Convention on the Prevention of Dumping at Sea of Wastes and Other Matters,
and the International Convention to Prevent Pollution by Ships.16 The supertankers,
which carry large amounts of oil around the Cape, are usually old and lack proper
maintenance. There are currently between 30 and 50 oil tankers sailing around the Cape
every month.17 This increases the possibility of oil spillages with disastrous effects on
"
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17
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See United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 559, p. 285.
Venter, D. 1996. Op cit., pp. 44-45.
Venter, D. Ibid., pp. 39-40. See also Bessone, R.G.D. 1979. Op cit., pp. 17,25.
Roelofse-Campbell, Z. 1989. "Sea Power: South Africa Between Latin America and India - An
Interview with Eric Morris". Unisa Latin American Report, 5 (2), September, p. 49.
Venter, D. 1996. Op cit., p. 44.
Venter, D. 1996. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
Du Plessis, L. "The Challenge of Effective Sub-Saharan Maritime Defence", in Du Plessis, L. and
Hough, M. (eds) 1998. Protecting Sub-Saharan Africa: The Military Challenge. Pretoria: Human
Sciences Research Council (HSRC), p. 152.
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marine life. IS For this purpose, it is important that a well co-ordinate<! armed deterrent
should be available to cover the region.
Poaching, especially in the high seas, where the navies of most of the member states
cannot monitor and patrol, also poses a serious challenge. It was against this background
that South Africa decided on 20 August 1997 to enforce its Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ)19 around Prince Edward Islands. The growing interest in the fishing ofPetagonian
Toothfish in the south Atlantic and Antarctica by the extra-regional powers poses a
serious threat both in the fish industry of the region and the protection of marine
resources. The South African Department of Environment and Tourism estimated that as
from 1996, about US$ 20 million worth (or 5 000 tons) of Toothfishwere illegally
removed from around the Prince Edward Islands by foreign vessels. The Toothfish stocks
of the South American countries are virtually non-existent due to poaching.2o The more
capable navies of the region therefore have an extra responsibility to cover areas that fall
outside their EEZs. With a 3000krn iong coastline and an EEZ of about 4,3 million krn2,
including the Prince Edward Island group, South Africa has the largest naval
responsibility on the African side of the Zone. On the western side of the Atlantic, these
navies are Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and on the eastern side, they are Nigeria, Ghana
and South Africa. At the moment the latter three only have what could be regarded as
constabulary navies.21
The additional financial burden imEosed on such navies restricts their ability to
keep the whole region under surveillance. 2 UNCLOS III, which makes provision for the
establishment of the International Seabed Authority and the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea, where the former would determine and regulate the exploitation of the
seabed beyond national jurisdiction, and the latter would deal with disputes, does not
cater for enough financial assistance for navies with additional responsibilities.23
Consequently, large parts of the region might remain vulnerable to poaching and
disastrous leakage's from tankers carrying oil or radioactive materials. However, the
approval of the South African National Defence Force's long-term arms acquisition
programme by the South African cabinet in November 1998 augurs well for the region.
The programme provides for the acquisition of four corvettes, three submarines and four
maritime helicopters.
PEACE AND SECURITY
It is in this area where the armed forces of the region have a definite role to play.
Article 4 of Resolution 41/11 of27 October 1986 calls upon all States of the region and of
all other regions to:
18
19
20
21
22
23
Grove, E. 1995. "Naval Co-operation in the South Atlantic", in Mills, G. (ed.) 1995. Op cit.,
p. 224.
In terms of Article 57 of the Convention of the Law of Sea, 1982, the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) refers to the territorial sea extending 200 nautical miles from the base line of the country's
coast. The state has sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources within that area,
including the seabed and its sub-soil. See Van Niekerk, H. 1995. "The United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea 1982", in Mills, G. (ed.) 1995. Op cit., p. 102.
Statement issued by the Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism on 20 August 1997.
Roelofse-Campbell, Z. 1989. Op cit., p. 49.
For a detailed discussion on the implications of unequal financial burden-sharing, see Roux, A.
1997. "The Budgetary and Welfare Consequences of Security Co-operation in the Southern
Hemisphere: A South African Perspective." Scientia Mi/itaria, Vol. 27, pp. 1-12.
Van Niekerk, H., 1995. Op cit., p. 100.
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• co-operate in the elimination of all sources of tension in the zone;
• respect the national unity, sovereignty, political independence and territorial
integrity of every State therein;
• refrain from the threat or use of force;
• observe strictly the principle that the territory of a State shall not be the object
of military occupation resulting from the use of force in violation of the
Charter of the United Nations; and
• observe the principle that the acquisition of territories by force is
inadmissible.24
This ambitious article would remain an empty commitment if it could not be
pragmatised, i.e. converted into action, or enforced if any member state's activities
seemed to threaten peace and security.in the region. No mechanisms of intervention were
put in place to cater for such situations.
The Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the South Atlantic taken by the Zone
member states at its third meeting at Brasilia on 21 and 22 September 1994, and later
adopted as resolutions 49/26 of December 1994 and 49/84 of II January 1995 by the UN
General Assembly, represented a turning point in the security history of the region.
According to this declaration, the whole South Atlantic region was declared a nuclear-free
zone. It placed a responsibility on the member states to enforce it. It also obliges the UN
to intervene in case any nuclear power, especially those outside the Zone region, deploys
nuclear weapons in region. With the coming into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (14
February 1967) and Pelindaba Treaty (II April 1996) which respectively declare Latin
America and Caribbean, and Africa nuclear-free zones, the Zone countries do not have to
deal immediately with higher-order security threats, but mainly threats associated with
criminality that is affecting the region. '
However, there are worrying contradictions within the ZPCSA system. The first
contradiction was pointed out by President Mandela during his speech at the opening of
the Fifth Session of the Independent World Commission on the Oceans held in Cape
Town on II November 1997. While he identified the Zone as one of the mechanisms to
bring about South-South co-operation in an effort to ensure economic development, peace
and security in the region, he expressed his concern at " ... the continuing militarisation
and nuclearisation of the seas by a few naval powers." He further emphasised the fact the
"international effort to demilitarise the oceans and make them nuclear-free, of which the
Treaty of Pelindaba is part, must succeed.,,25 If the oceans have to be free of criminal
activity and dumping of hazardous wastes, there has to be credible military presence to
monitor them. For this purpose, a distinction might have to be made between 'benevolent
and malevolent' military presence. The latter should refer to military presence of extra-
regional powers acting individually or in concert with a member of the Zone in
contravention of any of the resolutions of the Zone and those adopted by the UN with
regard to the Zone. The former could refer to a military presence comprised of a multi-.
national force in service of the Zone ideals.
The second contradiction is the provision in Article I of the Antarctic Treaty (1959)
that the Antarctic area has "to be used for peaceful purposes only" and that military
24
25
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Article 4 of the General Assembly's Resolution 41/11 of27 October 1986.
Speech by President Nelson Mandela at the opening of the fifth session of the Independent World
Commission on the Oceans, Cape Town, II November 1997.
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activity such as weapon testing is prohibited, but "military personnel and equipment may
be used for scientific research or any other peaceful purposes." This provision therefore
does not totally prohibit military items in the Antarctic, the bulk of which will have to
pass through the Zone region, but requires that the purposes for which they are brought to
the Antarctic should be peaceful. The onus is therefore on the Zone member states to
determine how peaceful the intentions are of the powers which bring massive military
equipment either for scientific research or peaceful purposes. Complicating matters is the
advancement in technology, which might make the verification process for malevolent
military intentions extremely difficult.
The other contradiction is the declared intention or the already on-going process of
producing nuclear-powered ships by Argentina and Brazil. While the existing political
situation in the western South Atlantic sub-region is relatively calm and is characterised
by a spirit of co-operation, rather than competition, the future is unpredictable. The
economic co-operation in the form of the Mercusor group can only give hope that arms
race of the early 1980s will not be repeated. It is also encouraging to note that Argentina,
Brazil and South Africa have signed and ratified most of the nuclear weapons control
regimes. These include the Limited! Partial Test Ban Treaty (8 August 1963); the Treaty
on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (I July 1968); the Seabed Treaty (11 February
1971) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (10 September 1996). Of these
treaties, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is of particular significance
to the Zone region. The CTBT identifies countries with monitoring stations and
laboratories that might be used to detect any nuclear explosions. Argentina and Brazil
have eight and six stations respectively, while each has one laboratory.26 Despite her
historically offensive-defensive posture which culminated in the manufacture of six
nuclear devices in the late I980s, South Africa was the first country in the world "that had
fully developed, and then voluntarily dismantled her military nuclear capability.,,27
These contradictions are particularly important especially when considering the
geo-strategic value of the region, both to the individual countries inside and outside Zone,
and the activities of various regional security and economic groupings. For instance,
according to Bessone "[v)ery important lines of communications converge in the South
Atlantic. In case of war, it would be easy to obstruct the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez
and Panama Canals. Maritime traffic through the Arctic has very severe limitations. The
South Atlantic is the only maritime access-way open to the East Coast of the Americas
and to Western Europe. Its control is important for the supply and security.,,28 Despite
these contradictions, it appears the value of security co-operation within the context of the
Zone far outweighs the dangers in its absence.
Thus, a common security agenda, which could be underpinned by confidence-
building mechanisms such as joint exercises and high-profile visits by senior political and
military officials from either side of the Atlantic, will have to be designed. Joint
exercises, such as ATLASUR and UNIT AS could be expanded to include other SADC
countries, even if using their personnel either as observers or full participants, i.e. as
crews aboard South African or Latin American ships. South Africa is already
participating in both of these exercises, even though as an 'invited participant' in
UNIT AS. The need for such an agenda among the Zone countries is not only geographic
26
27
28
Capdevila, G. 1998. "Disarmament: Treaty Targets Argentina, Brazil and Chile." Inter Press
Service, 4 May.
Robinson, T. and Boutwell, J. 1996. "South Africa's Arms Industry: A New Era of Democratic
Accountability?" Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 22, No.4, pp. 601-602.
Bessone, R.G.D. Op cit.. p. 20.
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and practical but historical as well. This is demonstrated by the historical involvement of
the Mercusor countries in peace support operations in Africa.
Mercusor countries and peace support operations in Africa
While no peacekeeping operations have had to be launched on the territories of the
Mercusor countries, the African side of the Zone has been affected by internal strife and
political instability. As Table 2 indicates, the Mercusor countries (with the exception of
Paraguay) have contributed significantly to peacekeeping operations in (especially
southern) Africa. It was only in UNTAG (United Nations Transition Assistance Group-
April 1989 to March 1990) in which only the countries from the Andean Group, Central
and Caribbean were involved.29
Operation Location Date Argentina Brazil Uruguay Paraguay
ONUC Zaire July 60 - June 64 • •
UNAVEMI Angola Jan 89 - June 91 • •
UNAVEMlI Angola June 91 - Feb 95 • •
UNAVEMIIl Angola Feb 95 - June 97 • •
MINURSO Western Sept 91 - to date
Sahara
UNUMOZ Mozambique Dec 92 - Dec 94 • • •
UNOSOMil Somalia May 93- March 95 •
UNAMUR Ugandan side Oct 93 - Mar 96 •
of Rwanda!
Uganda border
UNAMIR Rwanda Oct 93 - March 96 • • •
MONUA Angola July 97 to date • •
Table 2: Peace operations involving Mercusor and Africa
Key:
MINURSO
MONUA
ONUC
UNAMIR
UNAVEM
UNOMUR
UNOSOM
UNUMOZ
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara(Andean and Central
and Caribbean countries were also involved).
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
United Nations Operation in the Congo
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
United Nations Angola Verification Mission
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
United Nations Operation in Somalia
United Nations Operation in Mozambique
Conclusion
South Afiica's strategic position - being located between the Atlantic and Indian
oceans - offers numerous opportunities as well as threats. The member states of the Zone
recognise the strategic value of South Africa's geographic position as the 'gate-keeper' to
access into South Atlantic region. This 'gate-keeping' role requires not only a strong
29
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The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) - April 1989 to March 1990 - had
members from Costa Rica, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, but no
members from the Mercusor group.
Scientia Militaria 28(2) - 1998
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 28, Nr 2, 1998. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
navy on the part of South Africa, but also good co-operation and constant co-ordination
with the navies of the Zone. Financial constraints, and in some cases, geopolitical
maneuverings by some states in the region remain main challenges to making the Zone an
effective mechanism that is designed both for confidence-buildjng and decisive action.
With Africa having the largest number of landlocked countries in the world, the
Zone provides an ideal environment in which such countries can continue to maintain and
improve their links with the rich countries of the North. It should be noted that while the
Zone seeks to demilitarise the South Atlantic region, it requires a strong regional military
(particularly naval) capability in order to monitor the region. Piracy, illegal fishing and
trafficking in drugs and small arms can be dealt with effectively if the Zone countries
have adequate sea-worthy and faster patrol vessels. These, in tum, require the
harmonisation and co-ordination of national (maritime) security policies. Harmonisation
of policies will have to take cognisance of the unequal levels of economic development of
the Zone member states and their .vulnerability to maritime security challenges. Co-
ordination could include the establishment of institutional structures to pursue security
objectives and to identify each country's capacity and potential role within the Zone
system.
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